Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ACIS 2004 Proceedings

Australasian (ACIS)

December 2004

Data ' Information ' Knowledge? The Perspective of
Media Philosophy on Knowledge and its
Management
Boris Wyssusek
Queensland University of Technology

Rainer Totzke
University Leipzig

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2004
Recommended Citation
Wyssusek, Boris and Totzke, Rainer, "Data ' Information ' Knowledge? The Perspective of Media Philosophy on Knowledge and its
Management" (2004). ACIS 2004 Proceedings. 37.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2004/37

This material is brought to you by the Australasian (ACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ACIS 2004
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Data Æ Information Æ Knowledge?
The Perspective of Media Philosophy on Knowledge and its Management
Boris Wyssusek
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Australia
Email: b.wyssusek@qut.edu.au
Rainer Totzke
University Leipzig
Leipzig, Germany
Email: rainer.tozke@gmx.de

Abstract
Within the last decade the notion of knowledge has gained increasing attention in information systems research.
Yet despite this development the understanding of ‘knowledge’ is still immature. Recognizing this issue,
researchers have turned their attention toward fundamental aspects of the notion of knowledge, drawing on
disciplines which are most relevant for the study of knowledge, e.g., philosophy or sociology of knowledge. We
draw on the discipline of media-philosophy and show how this can help to develop a sound understanding of
knowledge and contribute to the ‘re-discovery’ of important forms of knowledge that so far have been neglected
in information systems research.
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INTRODUCTION
“Knowledge” has gained increasing attention during the last decade in the field of information systems research.
This development, however, has not led to a unified theory of knowledge; instead, we are confronted with a host
of different and mostly incommensurable notions of knowledge in the literature. Subsequently we find notions of
knowledge combined with other information systems concepts that—on the basis of the underlying
presuppositions—are not compatible and should not be combined. Recognizing these fundamental issues,
researchers in information systems have turned their attention toward the fundamental aspects of the notion of
knowledge, drawing on disciplines which are most relevant for the study of knowledge, e.g. philosophy and
sociology of knowledge.
As a result of this development, forms of knowledge gained attention that were almost forgotten or have been
considered as only ‘secondary’ in the recent past. With the pragmatist turn in the philosophy of the 20th century
(e.g., William James, Heidegger, Dewey, Ryle, Austin, and Wittgenstein), the relationship between theoretical
(explicit) knowledge and practical capabilities (and the related implicit knowledge) has been reconsidered. The
explicit theoretical knowledge is no longer regarded as the sole basis of all knowledge, but as the ‘tip of the
iceberg’ that is grounded in a ‘sea’ of the implicit knowledge and the practices of social communities.
This methodic rearrangement of the relationship between knowledge and practical capabilities can be found in
the now classic writings of, e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), and Argyris and Schön (1978), as well as in the
contemporary writings of authors dealing with the analysis of organizational knowledge (e.g., Baumard, 1994;
Willke, 1998). At the same time different forms of knowledge representation (e.g., narrative, logic-scientific,
etc.) and their respective knowledge-practical implications have become issues in the debate on organizational
knowledge. Contemporary knowledge management literature quite often refers to Polanyi’s (1958) notion of
implicit knowledge. But this sole reference overshadows the fact that the relationship between implicit and
explicit knowledge has been an issue in philosophy ever since. It can be traced back to, e.g., Plato’s “Phaedrus”,
Heidegger’s “Time and Being”, or Ryle’s (2002) “The Concept of Mind.”
With reference to our practical “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) and with the methodic differentiation of
“readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) and “presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit), Heidegger re-arranges the
relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge (Dreyfus, 1990). Practical-implicit knowledge about
our dealings with ‘things’ that are “ready-to-hand” precedes theoretical-explicit knowledge about ‘things’ that are
“present-at-hand” (Heidegger, 1986). Ryle adopts Heidegger’s perspective and gives precedence to the practical-

implicit “knowing how” over the theoretical-explicit “knowing that”: the latter is always grounded in the first
(Ryle, 2002).
Within the knowledge management literature the tradition of the philosophical debate on the relationship between
implicit and explicit knowledge has gained only little attention—it is focused almost entirely on Polanyi.
References to, e.g., Heidegger or Ryle are rare and are often characterized by a superficial reading of the
respective sources (Willke, 1998).

OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER
In our paper we are concerned with the notion of knowledge from the perspective of media philosophy, focusing
on a distinct area of organizational knowledge referred to as literal knowledge. This area has not been chosen
arbitrarily, but rather with respect to the overwhelming importance attributed to written text in the context of
organizational learning and knowledge management. With reference to the works of Heidegger and Ryle we
perform a pragmatist reflection on the notion of knowledge in order to make the fundamental ideas of these
authors fruitful for the debate on organizational knowledge and organizational learning.
Written text is still the preferred media for ‘storage’ and ‘transfer’ of knowledge. Within the scope of the paper
we understand written text as a persistent form of speech acts and recognize—with respect to Goodman—its
operational aspects as well (Goodman, 1969). The latter implies the inclusion of the ‘contents’ of computer-based
information systems, data bases, etc.
In our paper we show that the text-oriented notion of knowledge is flawed and that this not only holds for the
conceptualization of organizational knowledge but also for the practice of knowledge representation in Western
science in general. Based on media-historical and media-philosophical considerations of literacy, our
argumentation is grounded in two theses:
1) The reductionist notion of knowledge is not a result of modern information science or the theory and practice
of knowledge management. On the contrary, it has a long tradition and is connected to the emergence of the
formal science in ancient Greece. 2500 years ago a new form of knowledge representation and knowledge
‘transfer’ evolved. Knowledge has been conceptualized and institutionalized by Greek philosophers as literal
episteme, as a logically and terminologically elaborated system of situation-invariant (generally) true
propositions (e.g., “the earth revolves around the sun,” “Perikles died in the year 429 B.C.,” etc.). We refer to
this as “epistematic knowledge design” as it provides the basis for the whole occidental knowledge culture
and is also considered to be the ideal of knowledge representation in contemporary enterprises.
2) Alphabetic writing is the media-technological foundation for the epistematic practice of knowledge
representation, and it is the foundation for the Western conceptualization of science as episteme as well. But
alphabetical writing not only induces science but also a certain misunderstanding of knowledge in general:
beginning with the development of the literal-epistematic, situation-invariant, de-contextualized form of
knowledge representation, knowledge was already increasingly considered to be an object in ancient
Greece—and was no longer embedded in the everyday practice of action and communication among humans.
At the same time other, more implicit forms of knowledge like techne (the technical know-how, being able to
get things done) and phronesis (practical wisdom, drawn from social practice), as well as other forms of
knowledge representation like narratives, proverbs, etc. lost attention or were considered to be deficient in
comparison to the new epistematic form. With this development the idea emerged that generally all forms of
implicit knowledge could be ‘converted’ into the explicit form, meaning into the form of situation-invariant
and generally true propositions. The epistematic form became the one and only ideal of knowledge.
By means of the difference between cultural orality and cultural literality and the corresponding capabilities of
knowledge ‘transfer,’ we will in the following sections: a) outline the limits and some fundamental
misunderstandings of the literal-epistematic form of knowledge (and knowledge representation), b) illustrate the
capabilities of other forms of knowledge and knowledge representation, and c) describe some of the
consequences derived from the pragmatist re-formulation of the notion of knowledge for the theory of knowledge
management and organizational learning.

LITERACY, FORMAL USAGE OF LANGUAGE, AND FORMAL “KNOWLEDGE
DESIGN”
The difference between empractical knowledge (that is implicit and not at all or only hardly verbalizeable—e.g.,
the capabilities of a craftsman) and explicit knowledge (that is verbalized and ‘transferred’ by means of
language) exists in all human societies, both oral and literal. Oral cultures are cultures that have not developed
writing. In our paper we understand writing as a means for the word-by-word representation of speech-acts. Oral
societies do not possess an external ‘memory’ for the storage and retrieval of their cultural knowledge bound to
language. All knowledge bound to language has to be re-enacted in such societies through social-ritual

performances of collective remembering. This process is the same that is necessary for the ‘externalization’ and
‘internalization’ of implicit knowledge, which can only be retained by continuing practice.
A large part of the ‘cultural energy’ in oral societies is thus bound by the permanent re-enactment and
memorizing of cultural knowledge. These practices are supported by forms of knowledge representation that fit
the mnemotechnical requirements of the process: in addition to easy-to-remember proverbs, ‘memory-friendly’
narrative (re-) presentations of concrete situations dominate (Havelock, 1990, 1992; Günter and Günther, 1983;
Assmann, 1992; Kullmann and Althoff, 1993; Goody and Watt, 1981; Ong, 1987; Günther and Ludwig, 1994;
Günther and Ludwig, 1996). Rhyme and rhythm of collective performances also contribute to the process of
remembering. As a consequence of this practice, the ‘transfer’ of knowledge does not happen word-by-word, but
rather is flexible and adaptable to the cultural situation at hand. This phenomenon has been described by the
ethnologists Goody and Watt as “homoeostasis” (Goody and Watt, 1981).
Only with the development of writing did it become possible to store and retrieve language acts in a way that
allowed the suspension of the practice of continuous re-enactment of cultural knowledge. With the practice of
writing as a means for storing cultural knowledge, discrepancies between different texts of the cultural tradition
became obvious. Thus, literacy enables the tradition to be dealt with in an innovative and critical way—an
important prerequisite for the development of the Western science (Assmann, 1992).
Additionally, literacy allows new forms of knowledge (re-) presentation: since under the condition of literacy the
mnemotechnical need for narration and proverbs is no longer given, formal and more systematic forms of
representation as well as the encyclopaedic structuring of knowledge became possible—the project of episteme
could begin. The essential feature of this new form of (scientific) knowledge representation is to be seen in its
formality, its logically and terminologically structured system of situation-invariant true propositions, and in the
role that formal logic plays in this ‘knowledge design.’ The formal character of scientific-epistematic knowledge
depends on the special formal character of alphabetical literacy, which we will discuss in the next paragraphs
(Stetter, 1997; Totzke, 2002).
The recognition of words as words—as formal syntactic entities—evolves only with the practice of phonematic
writing. During oral communication we do not listen primarily for syntactic structures rather we listen for
content. We listen for what might have been intended to be said and not for what has actually been said (on the
syntactic level of the language). What has been said disappears almost immediately and thus oral utterances can
hardly be an issue for formal analyses. Only with the fixation of speech acts through writing does the formal
analysis of utterances become possible, since only in the written form can utterances be re-enacted for review and
control.
To what extent the user of writing becomes aware of syntacticity and formality of writing depends especially on
the kind of writing system. In logographic writing like Chinese or ancient Egyptian each sign has a certain
meaning—it represents a certain word or a certain idea. In alphabetical writings the characters (letters, syllables)
are basically meaningless. They are just formal elements of a language. Thus, in phonematic writing we become
aware of the form of the text—the texture (Stetter, 1997)—only through the content of the text. Writing divides
the continuous flow of human speech into distinctive segments (words). But as formal syntactic signs in the sense
of “X represents Y” become words only recognisable and reproducible in a literal culture that evolved through
the use of phonematic writing. This relationship can be illustrated by means of a well-known example—children
learning the practice of writing: the phonematic analysis of oral utterances must be learned. Children are trained
to map certain phonems onto certain signs. If a child is supposed to learn how to write “window,” the child will
first be asked to speak the word very slowly: “w-i-n-d-o-w.” The aim of this exercise is to enable the child to
differentiate between various distinct phonems which do not actually exist at the ‘natural’ acoustic level since the
spoken word “window” is an acoustic continuum and not a sequence of acoustic fragments. While reading, the
child has to perform the opposite task: to identify the single letters and then to articulate the corresponding
memorized phonems, “w-i-n-d-o-w.” At the beginning of this exercise the utterance will not have a meaning, but
after some repetition the child will recognise it as “window”: It means window! Only through this phonematic
analysis and reading technique can the child realize explicitly that a sound exists which can be written down with
the letters “window,” which can be read and pronounced as “w-i-n-d-o-w,” and which means “window.” The
conscious recognition of the formal phonematic structure of language does not exist in non-phonematic literal
cultures.
Phonematic writing, especially alphabetical writing, induces the consciousness for words and syntax with respect
to oral utterances. This again is a prerequisite for the formal usage of language and for the development of formal
logic as well as formal knowledge representations.
The phonematic writing systems (e.g., syllabaries, complete alphabets) are different with respect to their
capabilities to make the various grammatical forms of language practice evident and to map the syntactic
connections between words. But only if the forms of language (e.g., inflection, tense and modus forms) are
evident does a reflection on the grammatical connections and logical relations within and between sentences

become possible. The ancient Greek alphabet had a much stronger “grammatical resolution” (Stetter, 1997) than
other language systems at the time, and allowed a much more differentiated development of logic and grammar.
With its letters the alphabet provides formal ‘placeholders’ for notions and propositions. This could be used in
formal-logical representations, e.g., “A→B,” “A↔B.” In pure orality meaningless elements of language are not
known.
The practice of phonematic literacy not only makes formal usage of language possible; for practical reasons it is
necessary: written communication has to compensate for some of its deficits since it is not bound to situations
and does not provide the possibility for immediate feedback. Additionally, the multimediality of oral
communication is not available in written (literal) communication. Whereas in oral communication there is a
whole repertoire of means available in order to convey our message (e.g., gesture, mimicry, intonation, etc.), in
written communication we are bound to the sole graphical-visual medium. The various systems of writing
provide different means for the compensation of lack of situation-specificity and lack of multi-mediality. Due to
its mapping of the phonematic structure of spoken language, phonematic writing systems are able to transform
spoken language in quite different ways than ideographic writing systems.
First, phonematic writing systems force its users to terminological preciseness. The semantic consistency of the
use of words must be much stronger in written text than in orality (Stetter, 1997). This requirement subsequently
leads to an extended and more formal vocabulary.
Second, the securing of the comprehensibility of written texts requires complete, syntactic accurately formed
sentences. This requirement leads to a syntactical standardization.
Third, phonematic writing requires the explicit differentiation between sentences and sentence parts.
Conceptually, oral connection between sentences like “and – and – and” (parataxis) become superseded by other,
more explicit forms of connections like, e.g., “because,” “as,” “as a result of,” “through” (hypotaxis). The
structure of sentences becomes more elaborate and more complex.
Since the alphabet provides a precise notation for inflexions it offers considerable possibilities for the syntactical
standardization of written text. On the one hand, alphabetical writing fosters the consciousness of the formal use
of language and formal logic. On the other hand, the practice of transferring written texts is connected with the
need for a disambiguation of these texts. This, in turn, requires grammatical and logical reflection, and formal
logic serves as a means for securing the always fragile comprehensibility of written text.
Logical analysis and the logical structuring of text become necessary especially when knowledge should be
transferred in the form of situation-invariant true propositions. The idea and the concept of such an epistematic
“knowledge design” depend heavily on the capabilities of the respective writing system. In orality the transfer of
knowledge is always bound to specific situations. Story-telling, performing traditional myths, and so on, are
always woven into a concrete (ritual) situation, and they are thereby adaptive to the situation at hand. Cultural
oral expressions of knowledge are quite often in narrative forms—for reasons of mnemonic practicability. In
general, such expressions do not have a right to claim universal situation-invariant truth, but rather they are
descriptions of concrete situations. And, it is neither necessary nor possible to categorize knowledge (re-)
presented in such forms.

ALPHABET, EPISTEME, METAPHYSICS OF KNOWLEDGE
A media-philosophical reading of the works of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle reveals the following:
3) The introduction and increasingly widespread use of the alphabet in ancient Greece made the formal-logical
analysis and use of language possible—formal logic emerges. On the basis of this foundation an entirely new
concept of knowledge is being developed: it is conceptualized as a system of written propositions which are
considered to be true independently of their context of creation: the project of the scientific episteme has been
born.
4) Synchronous with the creation of this new (epistematic) form of knowledge representation, its users develop
some fundamental misunderstandings of this concept of knowledge: knowledge becomes a “commodity.”
Knowledge is understood as independent from human practice. The epistematic form of knowledge
representation is regarded as the ideal and “the only true form of knowledge.”
In the following paragraphs we outline some details of the development of the concept of episteme in ancient
Greece by analysing fundamental ideas of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle.
Parmenides’ philosophical work evolved in a semi-literal environment. Writing had not yet been utilized in all
parts of ancient Greek culture at the turn of the 6th to the 5th century. Early Greek philosophers did not make
their work known by distributing the written text but by giving public performances. Correspondingly,
Parmenides adopted oral forms of representation with his teaching poems. But at the same time, he entered a new

field with respect to the content of his work: He comments and reflects upon new forms of argumentation that are
based on written text: argumentation using formal-logical inferences. And he develops a new text-based concept
of knowledge. The ideal of this concept are sentences of assumption, which are true or false independently of
their context of creation. The written word becomes the ideal of truth since it has a greater autonomy and
persistence than context-dependent oral utterances. Parmenides’ considerations about “being” and his famous
“rejection of becoming” can be interpreted as consequences of his logical-semantic considerations about the
epistematic science which is bound to written text (Stekeler-Weithofer, 2001). When science has the need to
fixate propositions which are always true (independent of the situation), and which will remain true forever, then
science must ensure that words (names) used in the propositions always refer to the same ‘things.’ Thus, when
science aims at general truths it must assume eternal substances (things) to which words (names) can refer. Many
philosophers after Parmenides did not understand that his idea of the eternal substances was just an ideal derived
from the practice of episteme—from the human practice of writing. Those who do not understand the idealistic
character of Parmenides idea fall victim to a metaphysical fallacy: that there are things ‘in the world’ that do exist
independently of any human practice. In philosophy the critique of this misunderstanding is discussed under the
label of “ontology of substance” (Heidegger, 1986).
Oral speech acts are generally bound to a situation at hand. Conceptually written propositions are generally not
bound to a certain situation. This is true for scientific texts as well as for texts that are used in enterprises for the
purpose of documenting knowledge. They are detached from situations and do not provide the context (situation)
for their appropriate use. For this reason the false idea evolves that they are true independent of certain situations
and certain human practices.
Based on the practice of alphabetic writing the project of the epistematic-scientific (re-) presentation of
knowledge develops. It is considered by its users as a form of human practice that stands above all other forms of
human practice since it seems to provide a more direct, more adequate access to reality or truth. “Truth” is
thereby regarded as a correspondence between propositions and some given ‘thing’—a concept known in
philosophy as “correspondence theory of truth” (Heidegger, 1986; Rorty, 1997).
The problems of these concepts of knowledge and truth become evident when we follow Plato’s further
elaboration of the idea of episteme. His dialogues are by no means protocols of actual conversations but they are
conceptually written texts. Plato makes use of possibilities that are provided by the written form of presentation:
the possibility that the reader can at any time trace back the path of the argumentation. In a strictly oral
presentation the listener would be likely to lose track of the argumentation. Thus, Plato’s texts are an expression
of the developing formal usage of language which evolved in response to the need for disambiguation resulting
from the use of alphabetical writing. Plato’s texts are at the same time a documentation of this fundamental
change. Plato continuously questions the meaning of single words (and sometimes gives ironic answers) (Platon,
1994; Ryle, 1994), and looks for criteria for the appropriate use of words. The goal of this exercise can be seen in
the creation of more semantically consistent texts (e.g., argumentations, knowledge (re-) presentations). But the
need for semantic consistency evolves only with the use of situation-invariant written presentations. Pure oral
communication and oral forms of knowledge (re-) presentation require this standardized use of words to a much
lesser degree since the situational context always given provides semantic support for mutual understanding.
On the basis of the alphabetical notation, Plato discovers in the dialogue Sophist two distinct forms of words:
onoma and rhema (nouns and verbs) (Platon, 1994). He uses this differentiation for the purpose of logicalsemantical analysis and disambiguation. The differentiation between onoma and rhema becomes the
differentiation between subject and predicate. Aristotle makes use of this differentiation (Aristoteles, 1920) and
develops in his “Analytica priora” and “Analytica posteriora” his formal logic which subsequently became the
foundation for all (re-) presentations of scientific knowledge (Aristoteles, 1992, 1990).
But the differentiation between logical subject and logical predicate leads to certain misconceptions. In
correspondence to the structure of propositions one tends to assume that the same structure exists ‘in the world.’
As Heidegger said, the composition of propositions is misunderstood metaphysically as a composition of ‘things’
(Heidegger, 1980). Such a (mis-) conception of the world and things, which implicates a misconception of
knowledge, has its roots in the texts of Plato and Aristotle.
In contrast, oral speech acts are generally understood in a holistic manner and at the same time in their practical
purposefulness (illocutive dimension) (Austin, 1962). It is the epistematic form of knowledge (re-) presentation
that is characterized by the appearance of logical subject and logical predicate, and which is quite often
metaphysically misunderstood. In pure orality one hardly becomes aware of “subject” and “predicate.”
It was already Plato himself who reflected on the problems that are connected to the project of written (literal)
episteme (Platon, 1994; Stekeler-Weithofer, 1986). Especially his critiques of writing (e.g., “Phaedrus” and
“Seventh Letter”) are to be interpreted as warnings regarding the inappropriate use of the literal-epistematic
knowledge (re-) presentation as well as with regard to a metaphysically exaggerated interpretation of the
scientific structuring of the world. It is his insight that the ideal forms of epistematic knowledge (re-) presentation

have to be projected onto the ‘real world’ by its users. His criticism points out that the propositions of science
(and of philosophy) are no eternal truths. The propositions are derived from human practice of communication
and acting and as such have to be (re-) integrated into these practices when being used. The conceptually written
texts of science have to prove their comprehensibility and usefulness from within human practice.
Our short trip through history of media philosophy illustrates that the media-technology of writing—and not just
the recent computing technology—already provides the basis for the (mis-) understanding of knowledge as a
commodity and an easily transferable set of characters or data. In his “Phaedrus,” Plato refers to the ‘ideological’
of our manner of dealing with written texts and depicts the ‘transfer’ of knowledge as an implicit practice that
only to a certain extent can be made explicit. Written texts are not knowledge. But they are grounded in a
(dialogical) practice and have to be ‘converted’ to knowledge by means of a process of sense-making supported
by the each given context (Kambartel, 1991).
The academy founded by Plato and the lykeion founded by Aristotle were institutions in which the “holisticdialogical” practice of the appropriate usage of the texts of the episteme was taught. They were a kind of
“communities of practice”—in the field of the commonly controlled creation of theoretical knowledge.

THREE MISCONCEPTIONS IN KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: CONSEQUENCES
AND “WAYS OUT”
The considerations about literacy and problems of literacy outlined in the preceding sections reveal three
fundamental misconceptions of knowledge. These are also relevant to the debates about organizational learning
and knowledge management since they lead to severe theoretical and practical problems. In this section we will
elaborate these misconceptions with respect to their consequences for the theory of knowledge management, and
we will provide sketches of possible “ways out.”
The fallacy of objectivism
Knowledge is not a commodity, not some external entity as one might conclude from the written form of its (re-)
presentation. It is always bound to human beings living in an always given social community that is based on
communicative practice. Knowledge is only knowledge in and for distinct situations (of its application). Its
relatedness to practices and situations is its fundamental characteristic. Knowledge cannot be transferred from
person A to person B in a technical manner. Knowledge can only be “induced” (Schneider, 2001). Written (re-)
presentations, e.g. in the traditional media of the book or in computers as well as narratives are only enablers of
this process of induction—but never knowledge themselves. Talking about “automated knowledge management,”
is, from our perspective, misleading since it just refers to some special version of “data management.”
The still prevailing technological paradigm in knowledge management, focusing almost entirely on explicit,
documented knowledge (re-) presentations and computerized information systems, stands in the long tradition of
literacy and has inherited its (mis-) conceptions.
The illusion of “explication”
Not all implicit knowledge of a person or an organization, respectively, can be made explicit in the sense of its
conversion into a situation-invariant written or computerized form. Even the scientific practice of literacy
depends on context and has its limits of “explicability” (Polanyi, 1958). Written forms of (re-) presentation of
organizational knowledge that are aimed at the logical and terminological preciseness of the language practice in
the sciences still require implicit contextual knowledge and adaptability on the side of its users: the users need to
have or need to develop the capability of projecting formal knowledge (re-) presentations onto their own situation
of understanding, learning and application. Consequently, effective knowledge management requires—besides an
optimal flow of texts and data—the chance for direct ‘exchange’ of contextual knowledge between the members
of the organization, the creation of communities of practice as well as the formation of direct interpersonal
learning situations within the organization. The latter can be supported by temporary job-rotation, organizational
theatre performances (Schreyögg, 2001) or professionally guided narrative workshops (Reinmann-Rothmeier,
Erlach & Neugebauer, 2000).
The fallacy of prioritization of episteme as form of knowledge (re-) presentation
The sole focus on the formal “knowledge design” of the episteme in the Western sciences has lead to an
unjustified and systematic prioritization of episteme and at the same time to a disparagement and exclusion of
alternative forms of knowledge (re-) presentation, e.g., of conceptually narrative forms). In the tradition of the
occidental cultural history the epistematic form of knowledge (re-) presentation became in fatal fashion the
incarnation of knowledge in general. Before the invention of the written (literal) episteme, the ancient Greeks not
only considered techne and phronesis as forms of knowledge, but also the narrative and dramatized presentations

of myths (Baumard, 1994). The oral-narrative presentations of knowledge by the ancient Greek rhapsodes
(“poem singers”) were not only multi-medial but also multi-functional. They conveyed complex social, technical,
ethical, and medical knowledge and had an aesthetical and spiritual dimension. The truth of such a knowledge
presentation was measured by its practical usefulness and effectiveness in human life.

SOME CONCLUSIONS
The reflection on the practice of conveying knowledge in oral societies reveals: narrative presentations have their
own competencies and their functionality. Narrated stories live on the presentation of vivid situations and are
able to induce knowledge. They can convey aspects that are implicit in human practices and that are not
explicable by the scientific ideal of written (literal) episteme. Consequently, it is necessary to apply this insight in
the context or organizational learning and knowledge management. The recent narrative approaches towards
knowledge management (Reinmann-Rothmeier et al., 2000; Reinmann-Rothmeier and Vohle, 2001; Hermann
and Müller, 2001; Schütt, 2000) are to be considered as a useful extension of the thus far rather limited repertoire
of tools for the elicitation, explication, and conveyance of knowledge. Especially story-telling and discussions
about stories bring the situatedness of knowledge creation to attention. Narrative forms of knowledge (re-)
presentation are capable of triggering communicative processes of learning. At the same time they support
developmental processes of integration and identity formation in and among social groups. The sole distribution
of written (literal) epistematic best-practice reports is generally not sufficient when members of an organization
are supposed to put this kind of ‘second-hand’ knowledge into practice (Schneider, 2001). Also the processes of
integration and formation of identification supported by story-telling become evident from the perspective of
cultural literacy: poets’ competitions and performances of tragedies contributed substantially to the integration of
the ancient Greek society. Thus, the didactical application of story-telling or organizational theatre performances
are standing in a long cultural tradition. These tools are indispensable for many purposes in organizational
learning and knowledge management—even in the presence of the capabilities provided by the digital medium of
writing and by information and communication technology. Narrative methods are advantageous especially in
situations when members of an organization are supposed to learn directly and effectively from successful and
less successful projects, when the destruction of communication or learning barriers is at issue, and, when
processes of double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) are about to be initiated. And, narrative methods
can also contribute to the cultivation of knowledge landscapes (Willke, 1998).
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